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Intelligence-Led Policing

International Perspectives on Policing in the 21st Century

Edited, and with an introduction, by
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Editor’s Introduction

Intelligence-led policing is a term that has only begun to gain currency in the last three to five years. For this reason, it lacks a single, overarching definition. Most would agree, however, that at its most fundamental, intelligence-led policing involves the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels. It is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse. It is innovative and, by some standards, even radical, but it is predicated on the notion that a principal task of the police is to prevent and detect crime rather than simply to react to it.

The articles in this booklet consider the question of intelligence-led policing from a number of different perspectives. Some document the manner in which it has been successfully implemented in particular agencies while others reflect upon its applicability to certain situations. Still others consider its background and the factors that make it a practical policing solution. They represent a range of opinion and experience in which virtually any police or law enforcement agency can see reflected its own reality.

We are facing increasing obstacles in policing. Unstoppable economic, social and political forces are having a profound effect, not only upon the world in which we function but also upon the manner in which each and every one of us does his or her job. And while we may be able to take some comfort from the fact that criminals do not change appreciably over time, the resources and opportunities available to them have increased exponentially along with the magnitude of their potential profits. Police forces are now dealing with crime that would be unrecognisable to the police officers of a generation ago and must do so with a rapidly shrinking resource base. The old models of policing no longer apply. We can no longer afford simply to react to each new situation, nor can we rely upon our traditional notions of crime and criminal behaviour. Intelligence-led policing may hold the key to our survival.

Whatever form it takes, intelligence-led policing requires commitment. Police managers must be prepared to stand away from traditional police philosophies and methodologies; to believe that operations can and should be driven by intelligence; to act rather than to react. They must be prepared to have faith in the intelligence process and in the judgements and recommendations of their intelligence staff. It may be a difficult, even painful, step, but it is a necessary one.

I am grateful to Richard Anderson, Principal Analyst with the Kent Constabulary, for this definition. Mr. Anderson’s article on the Kent Constabulary’s experience with intelligence-led policing is included in this booklet.
The Role of Analysis in Intelligence-led Policing

by Marilyn B. Peterson
(Management Analyst, New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice; President, International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts)

Intelligence-led policing, as defined and discussed elsewhere in this booklet, can take several forms, dependent upon jurisdiction and departmental mission. Whatever form it takes, however, the core element of intelligence-led policing is invariably analysis.

In 1976, Harris defined ‘intelligence’ as “the end product of a process, sometimes physical, but always intellectual.” The “intellectual” nature of the process refers to the role of analysis which, in Harris’ view, “is the key to the success of an intelligence unit.”

Analysis is the derivation of meaning from data. Law enforcement has always been driven by impromptu forms of analysis as police officers and their managers have gathered information and drawn conclusions about the nature of crime, its perpetrators and their motives.

In the past quarter-century, specific techniques and methods have evolved which are used by all levels of law enforcement to arrive at conclusions and to make recommendations for action. These techniques are part of what is termed “criminal analysis” and have been fully documented by groups like the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA) and its members.

The various techniques involved in work of this type grew out of the need for specific types of analysis. Visual investigative analysis, for example, was originally based on project management charting techniques and was developed to represent the Robert Kennedy assassination. Telephone toll analysis became one of the more prevalent types of analysis due to its use in providing probable cause for electronic surveillance. Link, or association analysis, was helpful in depicting the extent of criminal conspiracies by showing the connections between people, businesses and locations in organized crime investigations. More recently, financial analysis has evolved from the emphasis placed on financial and money laundering investigations.

Analysis is undertaken for both short-term (tactical) and long-term (strategic) purposes. Law enforcement decision-making is required in both instances and the facts and analysis that underlie those decisions are critical.

At the tactical level, analysis can be used to support community and problem-solving policing, crime prevention and investigations of all sorts. Problem-solving policing is a form of intelligence-led policing. It involves the collection of all available data on crime symptoms, determination of the extent of the problem through analysis of the data and provision of potential solutions to decision-makers. Generally, data are collected from a variety of sources (crime scene evidence, subpoenaed records, records checks, commercial database searches, etc.), analysed and prepared for indictment and prosecution.

At the strategic level, some of the same data collected for tactical purposes can be combined with other information to produce assessments of crime problems and to develop potential longer-term solutions to those problems. For example, a department might be investigating and prosecuting a member of an ethnic-based organized crime group on a tactical level. On the strategic level, however, the department might gather information on the group, its finances and business ventures, increases in its membership, its geographic range, its various criminal activities and its history. This information would then be used in the long range planning process and in the development of effective enforcement strategy. Strategic assessments of this nature allow individual police agencies to order their priorities, an important consideration in an age of diminishing resources.

The analysis required in an intelligence-led policing environment goes beyond that which has traditionally been practised in most law enforcement agencies. It requires the exploitation of all pertinent information and the analyst must be prepared to go beyond traditional sources such as police files to other government and regulatory agencies, private databases and open sources. The current proliferation of information sources through media like the Internet has increased the resources available to analysts by several orders of magnitude, meaning that they must work to a much higher standard than was acceptable ten, or even five, years ago.

The intelligence-led policing environment requires the analyst to be capable of viewing multiple data and finding both small and large patterns to guide police efforts. So too, the basic facts of current violations may not provide a true picture of a particular crime phenomenon. The analyst must be prepared to examine crime in the historical sense and to consider how similar crimes have manifested themselves in other jurisdictions. In this way, other motives may appear, larger groups and conspiracies may reveal themselves. Crime and criminal behaviour is multi-faceted and complex. Its true nature only becomes apparent when it is examined through a broad and powerful lens.

If intelligence-led policing is to succeed, executives and commanders require solid conclusions and recommendations based upon comprehensive,
far-reaching intelligence analysis. It is an environment that requires analysts to be not simply statisticians or compilers of charts, but rather to be managers, forecasters and, most of all, thinkers. Recognition that the development of conclusions and recommendations is an integral part of the intelligence process has been slow in many departments and even within the analytical profession itself. Executives can always choose their actions from alternatives presented by analysts, but those who limit their analysts to reporting the facts do not benefit from the insights of true subject matter experts.

Intelligence-led policing challenges the traditional understanding of both policing and intelligence analysis. Often viewed as a luxury, analysis becomes a key component in the planning and decision-making process and expertise of analysts becomes a valuable resource. As intelligence-led policing becomes the norm, more and more police and law enforcement agencies will recognise the critical nature of the intelligence function. The role of the analyst in policing will continue to expand and the demand for both professional intelligence analysts and for quality analytical training will increase over the next decade.

Intelligence-Led Policing: a British Perspective
by Richard Anderson
(Principal Analyst, Kent Constabulary, Maidstone, Kent)

Background

Kent Constabulary has 3,200 officers and 1,500 support staff. It polices an area of some 1,442 square miles stretching from the southeastern reaches of London down to the English Channel, with a population of 1.5 million. Kent contains both urban and rural communities. Dover, Europe’s biggest passenger port, and the Channel Tunnel Rail link at Folkestone, are the gateways to mainland Europe and present unique policing challenges.

In the early to mid 1990s, a number of factors operating throughout Britain led to the development of intelligence-led policing in Kent. Crime levels had risen sharply in the preceding years, particularly the property-related offences of burglary and automobile theft.

At the same time, the economic recession had increased the pressure for restraint in public spending. The police were expected to produce more with budgets that either remained constant or were reduced in real terms.

An influential report by the Audit Commission in 1993, meanwhile, recommended that increased use of intelligence from informants and other sources to prevent and detect crime would be an effective and efficient use of police resources.

This was followed by research suggesting that a relatively small number of individuals were responsible for a disproportionate amount of the total crime committed.

Despite this, a number of significant obstacles to change remained. Among these were the public perception of the police as a backstop for the perceived failings of other local and national government departments. At the same time, elements within the police refused to acknowledge that the widening gap between demand and supply for policing was untenable. As there was little prospect of a massive increase in resources, it was, in hindsight, inevitable that attention would focus on a critical review of demand for service and the methods by which the police might attempt to address it.

The Approach of One Force

In 1993, a small team within the Kent Constabulary was charged with reviewing the force’s current intelligence gathering capabilities in light of the Audit Commission’s findings and to make recommendations as to a way
The Force Intelligence Review, established the framework for what is now called the Kent Policing Model (KPM). The overriding objective of the KPM was, and is, to reduce crime and to increase public safety and it has sparked the most significant changes in the force’s methods since its founding.

The Review described the force’s intelligence capability as passive, poorly resourced, lacking management direction and producing little in terms of usable products for either uniform patrols or detectives. The few posts dedicated to information gathering were generally viewed as something to be endured on the way to another posting or else as a shelter for retiring officers or those on light duties.

The review team envisioned an intelligence function at the very heart of the decision making process. Each one of Kent’s nine policing areas would include a fully equipped and staffed intelligence unit. These units would be capable of recruiting and handling informants and conducting technical and physical surveillance. The intelligence provided by the units would be used to frustrate criminal activity and to target serious offenders, either through direct police intervention or by providing actionable intelligence to other regulatory authorities such as Inland Revenue, Customs and utility companies. While some of the elements of this new strategy already existed, the challenge was to establish a structure that addressed current and anticipated problems in some comprehensive fashion.

The introduction of this new intelligence infrastructure required major personnel realignments. These were, in effect, paid for by fundamental changes in the way in which the force responded to calls from the public. The introduction of crime desks eliminated the need for an officer to attend every reported crime scene. If a presence was required, specialist crime scene attenders ensured the consistency of information gathering and determined the need for forensic examination. Calls to incidents were graded and prioritised. Requests for assistance not directly related to the police function were redirected to other more appropriate agencies.

The KPM outlined specific activities which would require a number of specialist roles, along with requisite training requirements. This notion ran contrary to the common perception of the police officer as a sort of jack of all trades. The force has now identified key personnel for these roles and is currently engaged in succession planning and grooming of the next generation of key post holders.

Implementation

Following a successful pilot of the process in one area during 1994, county-wide implementation of the KPM took place in 1995. Its introduction coincided with the beginning of a major upgrading of IT systems. The result, in 1995, was a slight decrease in performance (crime up by 1.3%) which was grist to the mill of the minority resisting change. Considering the scale of the changes, that performance itself is now viewed as an achievement. The faith placed in the system by senior managers has been amply repaid by significant crime reductions throughout 1996 and 1997. Total crime in 1996 fell by 6.5% to 143,000 offences and in 1997 it fell by 16.3% to 119,000. Throughout that time, the model has evolved as the process matures. Our ability to describe crime and criminality in our area and to know our business has never been better although we know there is much more to explore and develop. The long term strategy is to continue to reduce crime to around 100,000 offences in the next two years and to sustain that level in the first years of the new millennium. Resources saved will be invested in the longer term crime reduction measures that will seek to divert and dissuade high risk individuals and groups.

The Role of Analysis

It was clear that the proposed new intelligence units needed an analytical capability if they were to produce genuine intelligence. A decision was made at an early stage to have dedicated civilian support staff undertake this analysis. Early speculation that the role required a police background has proven groundless. Analysts are considered essential members of the intelligence team and are directly responsible to the Intelligence Coordinator (Inspector rank). From an initial core of 12 analysts, with at least one in each area intelligence unit, the analytical establishment is now 26, with at least two in each area.

The analysts undertake both crime pattern analysis and intelligence analysis projects. A series of standard products has been devised in order to convey the analysts’ work to managers and operational staff. A weekly report reviews crime levels by both offence type and geographic location. Priority crimes and locations are subject to further analysis and combined with current intelligence on suspected offenders to make informed recommendations for future intelligence gathering and enforcement action. The weekly report is a crucial source document for the weekly resourcing meeting (a British version of the NYPD’s COMPSTAT process). The use of standard products provide fixed points for analytical contribution whilst permitting individual investigative support.

A great deal of emphasis is placed on building the picture of key criminal activities. Understanding and visualising the drug dealer network in a particular location, for example, concentrates intelligence gathering on identified requirements, assists in target selection for maximum disruption, suggests opportunities for informant recruitment and permits the development of hypotheses on future criminal activity based on planned enforcement.
action. Analytical products are intended to drive area activity and to double as a means of identifying targets requiring longer term intelligence gathering or higher level investigation from Headquarters-based teams.

The most significant benefit of intelligence analysis has been in the insights it provides to managers, allowing them to make more informed decisions. While initially there were both unrealistic expectations and a measure of scepticism regarding the predictive nature of analysis, all Intelligence Units and Area Commanders have come to appreciate and to rely upon its integral role.

**Measures of Success**

It is difficult to describe precisely what level of our performance can be put down to the introduction of the KPM. We have no control sample, no identical force that has remained unchanged over the past five years. That we are at the forefront of reducing crime levels is one indicator. That the Audit commission and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary have commended much of what we have done is another. Perhaps the two most telling indicators, however, are the number of other forces both from Britain and abroad who have come to see how the KPM might be adapted for their own situations and the difficulty almost all managers have in contemplating a return to the prevailing practices before the introduction of the KPM.

The KPM is by no means a panacea for all policing ills. Nor is it a completely revolutionary concept. Indeed, many of its constituent parts were already used extensively by other organisations. It has, however, given the Kent Constabulary the ability to confront crime in an active, rational fashion and to build continually upon each success. As much as anything else, it has successfully altered the pervading corporate mindset to one that constantly challenges current norms, one that seeks continued improvement and one that will not permit complacency.

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**The Future Role of a State Intelligence Program**

*by Martin A. Ryan*

*(Assistant Chief Bureau of Investigation, California Department of Justice)*

State intelligence programs in the United States do an admirable job of tracking gangs and organized crime groups in their jurisdictions, disseminating this information and strategically projecting the future impact of these groups on the criminal justice system and society. It is important to determine what the role of these state intelligence programs will be in addressing future events, however. To this end, a panel of experts identified four trends in statewide intelligence programs. They are: the explosion of technology; the nationalization/internationalization of crime; reliance on information management systems and the growing reliance on state resources.

**Trend #1 - Explosion of Technology**

Law enforcement agencies cannot afford to keep pace with rapid changes in technology. Until a realistic approach allows law enforcement to keep up with technology, its intelligence component will constantly lag behind criminal organizations, which are unhindered by either bureaucracy or budget restraints. Computers, the Internet and publicly available databases all help to make the unsophisticated criminal a sophisticated one. Those who previously had to rely upon their own, perhaps limited, talents can now employ the fruits of other people's intellects to achieve their criminal goals.

From a law enforcement perspective, it should also be emphasized that while the proliferation of technology has generally allowed intelligence programs to perform more efficiently, there are real risks in believing that technology replaces analytical thought, investigative intuition or genuine hard work.

**Trend #2 - Nationalization/Internationalization of Crime**

Criminal street gangs, long considered a local problem, have nationalized themselves by expanding into various states. Militia and criminal extremist groups are also organized and communicating on a national level. The internationalization of crime has contributed to the remarkable success of global criminal syndicates like Russian and Asian organized crime, Colombian cocaine cartels and the Italian Mafia. Many of these organizations cooperate with domestic crime groups such as criminal street gangs, the Cosa Nostra and outlaw motorcycle gangs.
Cooperative efforts strengthen criminal organizations by expanding markets for their illegal goods and services and by facilitating the exchange of information and methodology. They also compromise the ability of law enforcement to undertake comprehensive investigations or to make significant arrests. Thus, local and state law enforcement efforts must expand traditional investigative boundaries to include the international crime arena.

**Trend #3 - Reliance on Information Management Systems**

Law enforcement intelligence programs are developing both statewide and regional networking systems. These systems are designed primarily to exchange data on criminal groups. The mobility of these crime groups means that law enforcement cannot rely on local automated databases, placing greater pressure on state and national law enforcement intelligence programs to provide the necessary information management systems.

Again, while reliance on information systems has some value, it does not include the human analytical element that interprets data in support of current operations and identifies future problem areas.

**Trend #4 - Growing Reliance on State Resources**

Increasingly, local law enforcement officers are required to address a range of community problems, a process that has led them to become generalists rather than specialists. This is not necessarily the wrong approach, although it is essential to retain a core of expertise. Intelligence programs are most efficient when staffed by experienced investigators and analysts who can perform their functions as a full-time assignment and for some agencies, utilizing state resources is the most practical and economical solution.

The proliferation of technology and the growing reliance on information management systems have also contributed to this trend. Local agencies lack funds for the latest technology and to pay for access to the vast number of public databases now available. As local budgets are reduced and the costs associated with the latest enforcement tools increase, a state intelligence program will increasingly be called upon to provide and maintain services and expertise to local law enforcement agencies.

The panel of experts also identified events with the potential to effect the identified trends and chose those which it believed had the greatest potential impact on state intelligence programs.

**Event #1 - Occurrence of a Major Terrorist Attack**

The primary means of coping with any disaster is preparation. Thus, foreknowledge and forewarming can significantly limit the impact of terrorist attacks. While intelligence may not prevent terrorist attacks, it can significantly reduce their severity, since it is, by its very definition, a preventive tool. Increased interaction with federal agencies responsible for monitoring terrorist organizations will also reduce the chance of a major attack. Federal agencies have the resources to target the organizations, while local and state agencies have geographic familiarity and access to local informants.

**Event #2 - Legislation Enacted to Restrict Invasion of Privacy**

The public has an absolute right to protection from unwarranted invasions of privacy. At the same time, however, protection of the public interest is often dependent upon the ability of law enforcement to gain access to personal information on suspected criminals. A number of events could precipitate limitations on law enforcement’s ability to acquire such information. A major instance of law enforcement abuse of private information, for example, would undoubtedly lead to demands by both legislators and the public to impose severe restrictions on access to intelligence information.

**Event #3 - Development of Artificial Intelligence**

The development of artificial intelligence is a double-edged sword. While computers facilitate the organization and collation of vast quantities of raw data, some organizations may come to rely too much upon them at the expense of human analytical assessments. Information systems, including currently existing artificial intelligence, can only gather and organize raw data. It is the intelligence analyst who transforms this data into assessments of the current and future impact of crime that can be used in making well-informed policy decisions.

**Event #4 - Major Negative Change in Economy**

A major downturn in local, state and federal economies could have a disastrous impact on a state’s intelligence program. As mentioned above, it could lead some agencies to eliminate analytical positions and to replace them with an automated database search system. An economic slump would also compound the problem, already faced by most agencies, of trying to stay abreast of the latest technological developments.

**Recommendations**

Based upon the preceding information, the following recommendations are offered relative to the future role of a state intelligence program. The program should serve as:

- the intelligence source for local law enforcement agencies seeking perspectives on gangs, organized crime and terrorist groups;
The focal point for law enforcement access to newly-developed intelligence databases throughout the United States and the world;
- the focal point for national and international inquiries and requests for assistance regarding a state’s gang, terrorist and organized crime subjects;
- local law enforcement’s liaison to other state and federal intelligence agencies;
- a provider of direction in the development of national standards for intelligence collection, retention and dissemination for state agencies;
- advisors to the high technology industry in the development of computer software to serve the intelligence function;
- a lead partner with law enforcement associations in developing legislation concerning surveillance and intelligence gathering;
- a coordinator of intelligence databases in other agencies in the state to avoid duplication of effort and to establish a true state intelligence database.

**Conclusion**

The trends identified above are rapidly changing the way state law enforcement intelligence programs must operate. A state intelligence program can no longer exist within its own jurisdictional boundaries. It is now part of a worldwide community, particularly as advances in technology make national and international crime a reality. It will be relied upon by local, state and national law enforcement agencies to provide access to new databases and technologies and for the analysis and dissemination of valuable intelligence. This intelligence will enable public officials to be well-informed on the actual threat posed by both existing and emerging criminal groups and to develop effective responses to that threat.

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**Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (H.I.D.T.A.) Intelligence Program**

by Ritchie A. Martinez

(Criminal Intelligence Coordinator, Arizona Department of Public Safety),
Leo M. Jacques (Criminal Intelligence Coordinator; Arizona Department of Public Safety)

**Background**

In 1988, the United States government passed the *Anti Drug Abuse Act* and created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to administer and coordinate programs under the Act. The President appointed a Director (Drug Czar) of ONDCP, and made it a cabinet level position. ONDCP was given the responsibility to develop and oversee a plan that would facilitate the coordination of all federally funded counterdrug programs, including federal, state and local law enforcement as well as regulatory, preventive and treatment agencies.

Complex in its initial design, the plan was slow to develop as participating agencies changed existing programs, shifted priorities and refocused their ideas. In 1993, President Clinton signed the *Government Performance and Results Act* (GPRA), designed to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and to eliminate unnecessary costs. President Clinton stated that “the Act requires the formulation of strategic plans, of setting yearly goals and measuring and reporting how well programs actually perform.” Subsequently the National Drug Control Program agencies began to develop standardized formal strategies. One of the more significant program strategies developed by ONDCP was the establishment of High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) in various regions of the United States.

**Southwest Regional HIDTA**

The Southwest Regional HIDTA includes the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. These states are situated along the Mexican border and share a number of political, geographical and operational features. When the HIDTA was established, a major effort to develop a common strategy within the region was initiated. The significant problems discussed related to enforcement and intelligence issues. ONDCP directed all the HIDTA programs to evaluate existing initiatives and to fund only those programs meeting the overall southwestern regional strategy plans. This was a significant change from the old system in which each agency developed independent programs, often with limited regional impact.
It is a fundamental ONDCP tenet that well-defined intelligence programs are useful in evaluating the impact of the HIDTA-funded initiatives. To achieve this goal, the Arizona HIDTA created an Executive Board within the participating counties comprised of chief executives of local law enforcement agencies and federal agency heads. ONDCP requested that the board evaluate the existing initiatives and measure each program according to the entire region’s strategy. In 1997 the Arizona HIDTA Executive Board approved funding to create a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Center in Tucson, Arizona.

**HIDTA Center**

The Arizona HIDTA Center was approved as a co-located, multi-agency facility and includes both Intelligence and Enforcement Divisions. The new HIDTA Center immediately brought together in one location the dispersed units investigating drug smuggling within the state’s six southern counties. By the end of its first year, the Center housed approximately 140 personnel from different agencies, which considerably improved the flow of information and facilitated the coordination of operations. The Center serves as the hub for weekly intelligence meetings, case investigative briefings, tactical operational planning meetings and general training. The Center is also the base contact for task force operations along the Arizona border and within other HIDTA counties.

**Arizona HIDTA Center, Intelligence Division**

The heart of the HIDTA Center is the Intelligence Division. It is staffed by Intelligence analysts and investigative research specialists from ten different local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and military agencies. All the intelligence analysts process their agency information and work on assigned HIDTA intelligence projects. The Intelligence Division’s goal is to exploit all the available and accessible information on specific narcotic suspects or organizations and to coordinate this intelligence. Each agency analyst uses his/her agency’s computerized information system(s) to disseminate intelligence upon request of another HIDTA analyst or law enforcement officer. In addition, agencies have granted other agencies within the Intelligence Division direct access to each other’s system(s).

The Arizona HIDTA Executive Board has mandated that all HIDTA-funded cases will be processed and evaluated by the Center’s Intelligence Division to ensure comprehensive assessment and coordination. Law enforcement agencies request information on specific criminal suspects from the Intelligence Division. The intelligence analysts and research specialists act as a support and service center for, and work directly with, investigators. They assist them in the organization, analysis and graphic depiction of case information related to drug organizations and complex conspiracies. The intelligence analysts also evaluate and coordinate requests for sensitive intelligence information. The Intelligence Division produces strategic assessments based on current tactical information. The emphasis is upon a team approach, with comprehensive exploitation of available information. As well, the efficiency and effectiveness of the Intelligence Division is maintained through a constant process of review of its services, initiatives and programs.

**Conclusion**

The Arizona HIDTA Center and its Executive Board is a proven method of meeting ONDCP goals and of managing counterdrug resources along the Arizona-Mexico border. It provides an efficient system for the collection, evaluation, analysis and dissemination of valuable intelligence in support of the counterdrug mission. The ultimate goal of the Intelligence Division is to be a knowledgeable resource capable of providing critical information in support of both criminal investigations and regional planning.
Towards Intelligence-Led Policing: the RCMP Experience

by Angus Smith

(Officer in Charge, General Analysis Section, Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police)

Early History

Since its earliest days on the Canadian frontier, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has been a consumer of intelligence. Almost immediately upon its arrival west of Lake Superior in 1873, the then North-West Mounted Police (NWMP) began to engage local Metis (persons of mixed native and European ancestry) to guide its members as they established themselves across what was to become Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta.

To the so-called “old originals”, an assortment of Ontario farm boys, city-bred adventurers and veterans of the British Army and the Royal Irish Constabulary, the guides were indispensable. They showed them how to find their way across thousands of kilometres of trackless prairie and helped them survive in a harsh and unforgiving environment. The guides knew the land intimately; they knew where to find water and shelter, how to survive thunderstorms, blizzards and flash floods. Most importantly, the guides knew the people of the Northwest: the natives, the first settlers, the whisky traders and road agents. They spoke their languages, were familiar with their patterns and could identify their leaders and spokesmen.

Thus, as the NWMP established the rule of law in Canada’s Northwest, it was able to make use of the most important asset an organization can have: foreknowledge. Constables on patrol knew pretty much what to expect in the various settlements and encampments along their routes and the peculiarities of potential troublemakers long before they encountered them. Senior officers, meanwhile, were able to address the sorts of questions that have always bedevilled police managers: Where do I deploy my officers? How do I use finite resources to best effect? What should I do next? The NWMP may not have realized it, but it was exploiting intelligence to achieve both tactical and strategic goals. Indeed, the fact that it was done, consciously or otherwise, may in some measure account for the relative order and harmony that characterised the early settlement of the Canadian frontier.

Since those early days, the RCMP’s relationship with the concept of intelligence has been, at best, ambiguous and, at times, hostile. Traditionally, the term intelligence in the RCMP has been used to describe relatively short term measures associated with tactical operations. Intelligence analysts prepared link and flow charts or analysed telephone tolls, either for presentation in court or to document the investigative process. They may have worked alongside investigators, but they rarely had any influence on the course of the investigations themselves.

A sketchy form of strategic intelligence existed as well, usually associated with various Headquarters policy centres dedicated to matters such as drug enforcement, immigration, VIP protection and national security. Strategic analysts tracked and documented trends in their areas of concentration and periodically undertook special projects or studies to illuminate specific developments or phenomena of concern to the organisation at large. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, for example, the Strategic Analysis Branch of the RCMP’s Drug Enforcement Directorate assembled and distributed regular digests of drug trends, an annual drug intelligence estimate and a series of special reports on such matters as money laundering, outlaw motorcycle gangs and aerial cocaine smuggling into Canada.

While the RCMP was something of a trendsetter in its acknowledgement of the need for strategic intelligence, understanding of the concept lagged far behind. Intelligence analysts were seen primarily as writers, as “publications people.” They were rarely, if ever, consulted on either operational or policy decisions and were often pulled from their analytical duties to write speeches or to draft correspondence and public relations material.

By the early 1990s, Canadians realized that their country was by no means immune to the global proliferation of organized criminal activity. There was enormous pressure on the RCMP to develop strategies to curb the spread of drug trafficking, money laundering and contraband smuggling and to acquire both knowledge and understanding of the criminal organizations involved. A task force, which included a senior civilian criminal intelligence analyst, was established to come up with a strategic plan that would take the Force through the next decade and into the new millennium. After a period of consultation, the group reported back to the Commissioner, recommending the creation of a centralized criminal intelligence capability.

A Centralized Criminal Intelligence Programme

In 1991, the Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) was established at RCMP Headquarters, with overall responsibility for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence related to criminal and criminal extremist activity in Canada. From its earliest days, CID introduced a number of innovations that completely changed the understanding of intelligence in the RCMP.

As a Directorate, CID is directly responsible to the Commissioner of the RCMP. Its Director, a Chief Superintendent, sits on the RCMP’s Senior Executive Committee. This means that intelligence plays a key role in the
overall management of the Force. CID’s Criminal Analysis Branch serves as the policy centre for each of the Division Criminal Intelligence Programme components, which are responsible for tactical and operational analysis at the provincial level. CID also maintains the National Criminal Data Base, a free text, online repository of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence reporting from across the RCMP. Perhaps most importantly, all Headquarters strategic analysts were transferred into CID, creating a central core of expertise that covers virtually the entire range of criminal and criminal extremist activity.

Overall direction of CID is provided by the Headquarters Criminal Intelligence Management Steering Committee (CIMSC), made up of the Director of Criminal Intelligence and the Directors of the RCMP’s operational policy centres (Federal Services, Community, Contract and Aboriginal Policing Services and International Liaison and Protective Operations). In consultation with the Commanding Officers of the various provincial Divisions, the CIMSC determines national intelligence priorities, which are in turn closely tied to operational priorities.

As the importance of intelligence comes to be recognised and acknowledged at all levels of the Force, the RCMP is an organisation that is increasingly intelligence-led. This has been in large measure due to the attributes of the analysis programme, one of the largest and most far-reaching of any police agency in the world. The CID Criminal Analysis Branch and, by extension, the various provincial Division Criminal Analysis Sections provide RCMP senior management with a wealth of finished, current intelligence, not only on the nature and extent of criminal activity in Canada and abroad, but also on emerging trends and the future of crime. This information represents the foundation of true strategic planning. For the first time, RCMP managers have the benefit of both a broad and a long view of crime and its social, economic and political implications. This, in turn, permits the active, long term policy and strategy development as opposed to reflexive reactions to developing situations with little understanding of their meaning or context. The identification of intelligence priorities, meanwhile, means that planning focuses only on relevant issues, an essential consideration in a time of shrinking financial, human and material resources.

Innovative Approaches Developed

Aside from their concentration on intelligence priorities, CID analysts are encouraged to seek out and explore emerging issues and to examine little known but potentially important aspects of existing criminal activity. Over the past few years, analysts have completed special reports and studies on, among other things, telemarketing and securities fraud, data encryption and police corruption. Indeed, the corruption study became a catalyst for the development of a comprehensive RCMP anti-corruption strategy. A number of analysts are also involved, to varying degrees, in a continuing process of programme development; constantly seeking ways to improve and augment the RCMP’s intelligence function. One of the most successful aspects of this has been the development of the Strategic Intelligence Analysis Course. Taught entirely by working, senior intelligence analysts, it is now recognised as the preeminent police intelligence training course in Canada. RCMP analysts have also developed a two year analytical certification / apprenticeship programme and have delivered analytical training internationally.

Both regular (sworn) and civilian members of the RCMP work as intelligence analysts. Regular members tend to dominate at the tactical level, where a degree of familiarity with operations is an asset. The strategic intelligence programme is staffed largely by civilian members. While this provokes a certain amount of debate, most managers agree that civilian members are more likely to provide the continuity demanded by an effective intelligence programme. So too, they bring specific skills and training that are, in many respects, more relevant to the nature of strategic intelligence than a patrol or investigative background. Most of the RCMP’s strategic analysts have multiple university degrees in a variety of disciplines and a number of them have two or more languages.

Traditionally, analysts have occupied a rather lowly position in the police hierarchy, a problem compounded by the fact that it is an occupation that tends to be dominated by civilians. This has meant that staffing analytical positions has sometimes been a problem and that the best qualified people tended to leave. The RCMP has recognised that the effectiveness of its intelligence programme is completely dependent upon its personnel and has taken a number of innovative steps related to analyst’s positions within the organization. Civilian member analysts are now paid a salary comparable to that earned by their regular member counterparts. Beyond this, their value to the organization is reflected in their rank. The civilian manager of the overall analytical programme is a Superintendent-equivalent, the supervisors of the various analytical sections are Inspector-equivalents, while the analysts themselves occupy a range of NCO (Corporal / Sergeant / Staff Sergeant)-equivalent positions.

Reaping the Benefits

The RCMP’s road to intelligence-led policing has not been an altogether smooth one. Nor is the end necessarily in sight. As in any organisation, particularly one in its 125th year, change can be a difficult, even distressing, process. But at the same time, there has been acknowledgement throughout the organisation that it has entered a new world and that many of the old rules of policing no longer apply. In its seven years of existence, the Criminal Intelligence Programme has been successfully integrated into the RCMP’s overall management and decision-making structure. Perhaps even
more importantly, its value has been recognised by the people who make the organisation work: the patrol officers and investigators in the field. Understanding of crime, its meaning, its potential, is more profound than it has ever been and responses to it are becoming ever more innovative. To an increasing degree, the organisation turns to its intelligence programme for insight, for guidance. Intelligence-led policing was, and continues to be, both a leap of faith and a significant investment for the RCMP. So far, the returns on that investment have been impressive.

Intelligence-Led Policing: a European Union View

by Simon Robertson

(Head of Analytical Bureau, Europol, The Hague, Netherlands)

Intelligence and Policing - the Background

Whilst the use of intelligence has been common practice within the military arena for centuries, its application to policing within the European Union is a relatively new concept. It is generally accepted that policing has changed dramatically over the past twenty years or so, and the traditional idea that crime was a local problem has taken on a different perspective. The face and nature of crime is forever changing and increasing social, political and economic globalisation permits criminals to move at will, both within countries and internationally. So too, criminal activity may occur at a location far removed from that of its perpetrator.

This is particularly true within the European Union, where barriers between Member States have more or less been removed, making it possible to travel unhindered in most of the Union’s countries. The need to collect, develop and share information with others is of paramount importance. Within the European Union, the emphasis is now on the development and sharing of law enforcement information, a process that is often contrary to commonly held notions of policing.

Information has always been available to the law enforcement community, but more often than not it was never developed. It either languished on a card index system for perusal when required or, in the worst case, was held in someone’s mind until somebody else thought to ask them for it. This approach to information management might have been effective when crime was essentially a local matter and criminals were well known to local authorities. Times change, however, and proper development and sharing of information is often a decisive factor in whether an enquiry is eventually successful in court.

Europol and Intelligence

In most, if not all, European Union Member States, there has been a noticeable shift towards a more proactive, intelligence led, law enforcement approach to tackling all forms of criminal activity, particularly organised crime groups. This has been precipitated by the increasing sophistication of many of these groups, which has made it imperative to disrupt and demolish network structures instead of merely arresting individual criminals. Attempts to break up criminal networks will never be effective until all available information is developed and transformed into intelligence for use by law enforcement personnel.
Intelligence provides a sound basis from which inferences can be drawn to guide both strategic and operational activity. The fundamental question of what constitutes intelligence remains, however. There is no standard definition of the word, nor is there a common approach to intelligence work itself. Individual agencies tend to adopt policies and procedures that most suit their needs and herein lies a fundamental problem.

In order to address this problem, Europol has created a commonly accepted approach to analysis in cooperation with the law enforcement authorities of the Member States. This approach is the first step in the development of usable information. In this context, the word intelligence can be used to describe the process of interpreting information to give it meaning and of understanding the implications of that meaning. The word may also be used to describe a group or department that gathers or deals with such information or to describe the product of such a department and its activities. At its simplest, intelligence might be defined as processed information. Narrowed down to its law enforcement context, it can be described as information that is acquired, exploited and protected by the activities of law enforcement agencies to decide upon and support criminal investigations. Beyond this, the phrase information designed for action puts emphasis on the primary goal of intelligence: to decide upon and to assist planned and ongoing investigations.

Dealing with information involves an inevitable degree of interpretation. This in turn give rise to varying amounts of speculation and, of course, risk. Twenty years ago, information was often acted upon with little development. The degree of speculation was high, therefore the level of risk remained correspondingly high. As criminals become more sophisticated, information from traditional law enforcement sources becomes much more difficult to obtain. Information from other sources is much easier to obtain, however, and technological advances have revolutionised our ability to integrate such information with its traditionally obtained counterpart in order to manipulate, extract, analyse and disseminate it in the form of finished intelligence. Traditional methods of handling information are no longer viable as law enforcement agencies require as much knowledge as possible before embarking upon a course of action. This new emphasis on intelligence has resulted in a fundamental change in the way law enforcement conducts itself. Where operational teams used to drive the activities of the intelligence environment, intelligence now guides the operational environment.

The Role of Analysis

The key to the effective use of intelligence is analysis, whether it is operational or strategic. Again, there is a certain amount of debate over the specific meaning of these two terms. To date, there are no commonly accepted and clearly specified definitions, despite efforts by both Interpol (in its crime analysis booklet) and Europol (in its analytical guidelines) to arrive at a standardised interpretation.

Operational intelligence is typically of a short term nature and provides the investigative team with hypotheses and inferences concerning specific elements of criminal operations, criminal networks and individuals and groups involved in unlawful activities. Operational intelligence also concerns itself with determining specific criminal methodologies and techniques as well as capabilities, vulnerabilities, limitations and intentions. Some may argue that proximity to operations can cause an analyst's judgement to be influenced by the operational team members. Nevertheless, operational intelligence is most effective when it is undertaken as close to an operation as possible, with intelligence analysts working in conjunction with the law enforcement officers involved in the investigation.

Strategic intelligence focuses on the long term aims and objectives of law enforcement agencies. It typically reviews current and emerging trends to illuminate changes in the crime environment and emerging threats to public order. It draws upon a huge variety of information from both within and beyond the law enforcement universe to identify opportunities for action and likely avenues for change to policies, programmes and legislation. Although operational and strategic intelligence analysis have different aims, they are mutually dependent and cannot be carried out in isolation. Attempts to separate them, or to foster one at the expense of the other, will result in a fundamentally flawed intelligence programme and a failure to generate meaningful assessments of criminal activity.

Successful intelligence led operations, on the other hand, will produce concrete results and will inspire correspondingly higher levels of confidence in the process on the part of other agencies. This will lead to an increased willingness to provide and exchange intelligence, which will in turn generate further operational tasks. For this reason, the emphasis on intelligence led policing is an important one within the law enforcement agencies of the European Union, one that will undoubtedly lead to greater success in combating criminal activities affecting the Member States.
Intelligence-Led Policing in the United States: A Software Vendor’s View

by Jim Basara
(CEO, Memex Inc.)

Police Information Systems in the United States

Several articles in this booklet have addressed the factors that make the model of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) appear attractive. Richard Anderson did an excellent job of explaining the various reasons that the United Kingdom has moved to ILP, and indeed, the UK is often viewed as a model of the advantages that can be gained from ILP in terms of both resource utilization and crime reduction. Pany, Memex has ILP. Since office in 1997, we great deal of ining US public tion systems and applied to ILP, lessons that we from this experi-interest to both organizations and companies that provide information technology to this sector. It is extremely important that both of these groups realize the differences in information technology used to support proactive policing, such as ILP, versus reactive policing such as the reporting-oriented paradigm often utilized today in the US. While the philosophical differences between these two paradigms receive much discussion, the changes that must occur with the information systems are rarely addressed and not well understood.

Information Technology and Intelligence-Led Policing

Information technology under ILP must support all of the phases of the intelligence process. To date, however, most intelligence systems have focussed on the analysis or collation of intelligence and have not readily addressed areas such as collection and dissemination. This is often because the companies that produce the intelligence systems are different from those that produce other public safety systems and because the competitive nature of the market does not foster openness between vendors (especially competitors). Unfortunately, this has led to isolated intelligence systems which do not effectively integrate with mainstream systems such as CAD, RMS, Fire, Mobile Data, and so on. This lack of integration complicates the intelligence process by forcing multiple data entry points, limiting the amount of data available to the intelligence analysis systems, and hindering the dissemination process.

The responsibility for correcting these shortfalls lies with information technology companies on both sides of the intelligence line. Vendors developing traditional systems must open up their databases and interfaces to simplify access by intelligence applications and to allow intelligence users to update information on those systems. Intelligence systems developers, on the other hand, must continue to improve their flexibility to acquire data simultaneously from many public safety databases, as well as scanned information, email, web crawlers and other sources. While ILP, implemented properly, can indeed allow law enforcement organizations to cope with greater levels of information and complexity, these gains can be erased if resources are consumed repeatedly pigeon holing information into loosely-integrated systems.

It is also important to recognize that the composition of US law enforcement exponentially complicates the use of information technology to support ILP. While there are many reasons for this, the most difficult to overcome is the sheer number of law enforcement agencies within small geographical regions that must be brought together in order to have a full intelligence view of that area. The UK is indeed fortunate in this regard because it has so few agencies, each of which is responsible for a relatively large area compared to the US. Naturally, there are UK national agencies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service, but, by and large, the resources necessary to gather the bulk of the information necessary to perform ILP in the UK are controlled by a single agency.

In the US, we know that this is far from the case. US intelligence systems must be flexible and network-capable so that information can be extracted from public safety systems developed by many different vendors. Better still is the ability for intelligence applications to operate across data in those various systems WITHOUT actually copying the data into the intelligence system itself. In this scenario, users of the intelligence products can be confident that they are always using the most timely information in their analysis, as opposed to data that is only as timely as the most recent data load. Developers of intelligence systems under such a distributed ILP model are challenged in that they can no longer dictate rigid data input formats; some data may be text, some may be relational databases from different vendors, some may be proprietary format, and so on. Charting tools and other analysis applications must also be enhanced to work across all of these disparate data sets.

Dissemination - Special Considerations

The dissemination phase, or action phase of the intelligence process,
also presents many information technology challenges. In order to be intelligence led, the results of the analysis must be readily available to the people who need the information. Dissemination of intelligence is currently focused on investigation assets, which is the simplest problem to solve as the two disciplines normally have shared resources. Intelligence information also needs to be fed back to the CAD and RMS systems, however, so that officers on call can have the most up-to-date and relevant information at their disposal. Intelligence systems should even have the ability to alert officers to potential danger, or to the fact that they should attempt to gather specific information if the opportunity presents itself. If done properly, these tightly-integrated systems also allow EMS, Fire, and other calls to locations-of-interest to be used as rare intelligence gathering opportunities. Other examples of systems that should be directly integrated with intelligence applications include DMV, state interfaces, asset management (personnel), property tracking, pawn, registrations and more.

Of course, like collection, improving intelligence dissemination is complicated by the vast number of different organizations involved in US law enforcement. There is also a dichotomy here between the need to share information and the need for information security. Since any successful intelligence operation will rely heavily on information gathered from neighboring jurisdictions, wide information sharing is necessary to achieve buy-in through simple return-on-investment. Put more simply, neighboring jurisdictions are more likely to invest in the system if they get value back. To address this problem, flexible security must be embedded into each system so that they all can be configured to operate under a common security architecture as defined by the customer.

The Road Ahead

The challenges faced by information technology companies are daunting indeed, and they will require substantial investments by US companies who embrace the ILP concept. For Memex, the best way to achieve our vision was to acquire a US public safety software provider and pave our own road toward ILP. This acquisition is allowing us to achieve full integration of our intelligence products with a robust suite of public safety applications in the manner described here. If the ILP model does catch on, other vendors may not require such heavy investments because the environment will be more conducive to the close partnerships necessary to develop truly integrated applications. But, under ILP, vendors must prepare for radical changes in the way that their systems process data as well as for upgrades in their product lines to accommodate the new policing model. Without the support of software vendors, law enforcement will be left in the difficult position of attempting to become intelligence-led with technology that does not promote that model, and they will be left unable to reap the rewards of ILP.

Getting Started in Intelligence-Led Policing

by Russ Porter
(Special Agent in Charge of the Intelligence Bureau, Iowa Department of Public Safety)

Why Do We Need Intelligence-Led Policing

Physicians are trained to diagnose a patient -- before initiating a medical intervention.

Good mechanics figure out what’s really wrong with a car’s motor -- before they start replacing engine parts.

Professional football teams utilize scouts -- before the players take the field -- to gather information that will improve the team’s chances of winning.

Should we plan and carry out law enforcement operations in ignorance? Of course not. We need accurate and timely information that will identify and prioritize our most serious problems. We can then use that information to develop effective responses, and tell us if our actions made a difference. This process is intelligence-led policing - or ILP - and it is a concept that agencies can use to get results.

How can you get started with ILP? The steps for developing and implementing ILP will depend on a number of factors, such as the type of law enforcement agency, its mission and the environment in which it operates. An exhaustive review of the literature, accompanied by a list of all programs that might fit the ILP model, is beyond the scope of this article. But what follows are some brief suggestions for obtaining more information and getting started with ILP.

Recognizing ILP: What Is It?

First, you need to be able to recognize the ILP model. A review of various information sources and a comparison of programs that can be described as ILP will identify some common elements:

1. The production of accurate and timely intelligence and analytic products, relevant to the operational goals of the agency, that describe the nature and extent of problems affecting the jurisdiction.

2. The use of these intelligence and analytical products to develop and guide a strategy, operational plan or course of action that addresses the problems.

3. Continuing evaluation, follow-up and accountability to determine the impact of the strategy or operational plan on the problem, making adjustments as needed.
Critical to the success of the ILP concept is that these steps be integrated; that is, none of these components can stand alone.

Examples of ILP Models

**COMPSTAT.** Certainly COMPSTAT, the award-winning strategy used by the New Police Department (NYPD), is consistent with the ILP model. The COMPSTAT Process consists of four principles of crime reduction that are integrated into virtually every function and activity undertaken by the NYPD. Although other police departments nationwide are producing intelligence data, using computers to map crime, and improving crime-fighting methods in other ways, the NYPD has been recognized for taking one other essential step. With COMPSTAT, the Department holds frequent crime strategy meetings (usually twice a week), attended by police officials from all levels and different units of the department. They review the intelligence and computer data, and discuss ways to reduce crime in specific places. At these meetings, local commanders are also required to report on steps they have taken and their plans to correct specific conditions. These meetings ensure that managers are held accountable in applying the four principles of crime reduction. In addition to using intelligence-led operations, then, other important aspects of the COMPSTAT program are continual follow-up, assessment of results, and accountability. Many observers credit COMPSTAT with contributing to significant crime reductions in New York City.

**HIDTA.** The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) requires the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) to use a process that also fits the ILP concept. HIDTAs are joint efforts of local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies designed to address the drug problem through a variety of programs. Under program guidance established by ONDCP, HIDTAs must employ a process to (1) assess regional drug threats, through the development of an intelligence threat assessment; (2) design strategies based on the threat assessment to combat the threats; (3) develop initiatives to implement the strategies and (4) evaluate the impact of the strategies and initiatives. Thus, the steps in the process are guided by the initial intelligence threat assessment.

The concept of preparing law enforcement threat assessments to guide strategy and operations in the HIDTAs has been lauded by one authority as "a milestone in the evolution of law enforcement intelligence."

**Problem-Oriented Policing Strategies.**

Problem-oriented policing - or POP - fits the ILP model (although it sometimes depends on how POP is actually used). The ultimate objective of problem-oriented policing is the development of a more effective response to the problems police have been asked to address. The problem-oriented approach, as adapted from the original POP concept by other leading experts, consists of the following core elements: scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (the SARA model). The term "intelligence" is not typically used in the POP literature or the SARA model (perhaps because intelligence is often narrowly perceived to relate only to organized crime, vice, narcotics, terrorism, and similar activities). Nonetheless, the scanning and analysis...
steps in the POP process are consistent with the intelligence production cycle, and thus, POP strategies, in general, fit the ILP concept.

Other Programs. Your agency doesn’t have to be a HIDTA participant or be the size of NYPD to implement ILP. Law enforcement agencies of all sizes and types can apply this concept. (In fact, other agencies already do, but unfortunately, space limitations prevent them from being listed in this article). And in some areas, many agencies work together to use ILP.

The SARA Model

1. **Scanning/Problem Definition** - Rather than relying on broad, law-related concepts to define (and then respond to) incidents, officers are encouraged to group individual incidents together as problems. The problem, rather than the incident, becomes the primary unit of police work.

2. **Analysis** - Further progress requires the systematic collection and analysis of information about the problem.

3. **Response** - If the current operational response is determined to be inadequate, it is necessary to search for and implement a tailor-made response. This involves the situational selection of tactics rather than the universal application of a set of standards.

4. **Assessment** - During this phase, officers evaluate the impact of the tailor-made response to see if the problems were actually solved or alleviated. This requires measuring performance by evaluating the impact on problems, rather than documenting activities for performance measurement purposes.

Learning More

**Contacting others.** Probably the quickest way to get more information is to contact some of the agencies with existing programs. A few are listed at the conclusion of this article. Not only can they offer information about their own programs, but they can help you network with other sources of information and assistance.

**Publications.** At this relatively early stage in the development of ILP, a review of the published literature will not lead you to an abundance of information about “intelligence-led policing.” Instead, since the notion of ILP is a relatively new one, and because it blends ideas from many specialized areas (such as problem-oriented policing, intelligence, analysis, law enforcement operations, and performance evaluation and measurement), a few information sources for these specialized topics are listed at the end of this article.

**Getting Started**

The name of the program, or whether it is described in three steps or four steps, is not important. But essential to ILP is the notion that intelligence and analysis is used by management -- not only investigators and line officers -- to guide strategy and operations; that these steps cannot stand alone, but must be integrated with one another and that evaluation and accountability must be part of the process. To obtain more information about getting started with ILP, contact the organizations listed below.

**COMPSTAT**

Office of the Chief of the Department
New York City Police Department
1 Police Plaza -- Suite 1300
New York, NY 10038
Phone: 212.374.6710

**HIDTA**

HIDTA Assistance Center
8401 NW 53rd Terrace, Suite 208
Miami, FL 33166
Phone: 305.716.3270
Fax: 305.716.3218
URL: http://www.nhac.org

For the past two years, the NYPD has hosted a COMPSTAT conference each spring.

The HIDTA Assistance Center provides training and other resources to HIDTA participants.


*Some Midwestern states utilize statewide Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (LEIN) programs to apply ILP. Some of these LEIN programs, which began in Iowa in 1984, use the intelligence production cycle to identify problems and to mobilize law enforcement resources from many agencies to address the problem. The Midwest states with LEIN programs include Illinois, Nebraska, Kansas, South Dakota, Wisconsin and North Dakota. See, for example, Ruxlow Thomas R. and Stephen Henson 1988 (January) "New Intelligence Concept Curbs Crime" FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 57(4): 16-18

The organizations listed here are just a small sampling of those that have expertise in the field listed. Remember that many other agencies and organizations not listed here have information that can help you get started with ILP. Regrettably, they cannot be listed due to space limitations not because of their lack of qualifications.
Problem-Oriented Policing and Performance Evaluation

Police Executive Research Forum
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW,
Suite 930
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: 202.466.7820
Fax: 202.466.7826
URL: http://www.policeforum.org

Each fall, PERF sponsors an international problem-oriented policing conference. In addition, PERF also sponsors POPnet, an internet-accessible database of problem-oriented policing examples. PERF also conducts problem-solving and performance evaluation training sessions.

Criminal Intelligence

Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit
Central Coordinating Agency
P.O. Box 163029
Sacramento, CA 958 16-3029
Phone: 916.227.4218
Fax: 916.227.4097

LEIU is an international criminal intelligence network. Law enforcement agencies that are members of LEIU employ experts in the field of criminal intelligence.

Analysis

International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc.
Marilyn B. Peterson, President
P.O. Box 6385
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648-0385
Phone: 609.303.1825
Fax: 609.303.1825
URL: http://www.ialeia.org/
E-mail: peterson@ialeia.org

The purpose of IALEIA is to advance high standards of professionalism in law enforcement intelligence at the Local, State/Provincial, National and International levels. Included among its many aims: to furnish advisory and related services on intelligence analysis matters and to disseminate information on analytical methods and techniques. IALEIA holds two conferences each year and sponsors other training sessions.

Mapping/Geographic Analysis

Crime Mapping Research Center
National Institute of Justice
8 10 7th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20531
Phone: 202.514.3431
Fax: 202.616.0275
URL: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/cmrc/
Email: cmrc@ojp.usdoj.gov

The Crime Mapping Research Center offers many resources, including training and an annual crime mapping conference, to promote research and development in the field of crime mapping.
The International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA) was founded in 1980. It is a non-profit organization whose mission is to foster excellence and professionalism in the profession of law enforcement intelligence analysis.

IALEIA now has about 1,100 members in 48 of the United States and 30 countries in North America, Europe, South America, Australia and the Far East.

A large part of IALEIA's role relates to training and outreach within the law enforcement community. Its annual meeting, held in conjunction with the International Association of Chiefs of Police, provides its leadership with the opportunity to meet with police executives from around the world. In this setting, it can also invite those executives to share their experiences and advice relating to the appropriate role of analysis within the law enforcement community.

A spring training conference, hosted by an IALEIA chapter, allows analysts to receive more in-depth training in new or advanced analytical methodologies. These have become an international meeting point and in 1999, the spring conference will be held in the Washington, D.C. area and will be co-sponsored by the FBI and the RISS centers.

IALEIA also works with major law enforcement agencies and organizations to provide speakers for conferences. In 1998, it made presentations to the NCIS Conference in Manchester, England, the LEIU in Cleveland, Ohio? the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units and the West Yorkshire (England) Police Academy.

IALEIA publishes overviews and examples of analytical techniques in its semi-annual Journal. Shorter items of interest to analysts and officers (training schedules, local chapter meetings, job openings, etc.) are found in the Intelscope newsletter, published three times yearly, or on the IALEIA web site (http\www.ialeia.org). Submissions to both publications are encouraged.

An annual awards programme provides recognition to analysts, authors, police executives and analytic software developers. These awards, instituted in 1985, encourage excellence in law enforcement intelligence analysis. They are formally presented at the Annual Meeting each autumn.

An Executive Advisory Board, comprised of police executives who support IALEIA, provides management guidance to the organisation. Its members, listed below, also help IALEIA to reach other major organizations and agencies.

IALEIA also has Supporting Member agencies that encourage analytical efforts and professional participation. These agencies are listed below.

Membership in IALEIA is open to all law enforcement analysts, supervisors and managers, as well as military, international and private sector criminal analysts and officers. There is a special membership category for students and reduced rates for members from developing countries. For more information, write IALEIA, P.O. Box 6385, Lawrenceville, New Jersey, 08648-0385 or call IALEIA President Marilyn Peterson at (609)984-1035 (New Jersey). In Canada, contact IALEIA Executive Director Robert C. Fahlman at (613)998-6094. In Europe, contact International Relations Director Simon Robertson at 31-70-302-5-255.
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